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STATE OF UTAH, 
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-vs-
JOSEPH B. MORA, a/k/a 
WESLEY JOHN HARMON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
i — - - • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty in a 
criminal action against appellant Joseph B. Mora, for aggravated 
assault. 
! DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Judge 
Bryant H. Croft, sitting with a jury. The jury returned 
a verdict finding the defendant guilty of aggravated assault 
and a judgment, sentence and commitment was entered. From 
the action of the trial court the appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON^APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and 
judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's first witness, Leslie Appling testified 
that she knew appellant (T.86), that she saw him on 
November 16, 1974, at approximately 6:30 p.m. in Emigration 
Canyon (T.86), and that she told him that his girlfriend, 
Cindy Proctor, was at Jim Ingle's house (T.87). 
The State's chief witness, James Ingle testified 
that he went to answer a knock at his door about 7:15 p.m. 
and found appellant on the stairs leading to the second 
floor of his house (T.101). He further testified that 
appellant asked questions about the whereabouts of Ms. 
Proctor and when Mr. Ingle refused to answer the questions 
and told appellant to leave, appellant pulled a revolver 
from his coat (T.103), hit Mr* Ingle in the head with 
his hand, put the cocked gun to Mr. Ingle's forehead and 
asked further questions about Ms. Proctor. Mr. Ingle 
stated that after he had answered the questions and wrote 
down some information, appellant put the cocked gun in 
Mi:. Ingle's mouth, told him not to call the police and 
left (T.109). 
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The appellant testified that when he went into 
the house Mr. Ingle pointed a rifle at him (T.163,164) 
and that he knocked the rifle aside (T.165) and pointed 
his gun at Mr. Ingle (T.165). The appellant testified 
that he made Mr. Ingle give him some requested information 
concerning the whereabouts of his girlfriend (T.167) 
and left (T.168). 
On the second day of trial, appellant's counsel 
made a motion to suppress testimony regarding guilty 
pleas appellant had entered on two previous felony charges 
(T.190-193). The court denied the motion, concluding that 
the convictions were valid and admissable (T.199). Appellant's 
counsel asked the court's permission to advise his client 
to refuse to answer further questions of the prosecutor 
(T?199). The court denied this request (T.199). The court 
then asked if appellant's counsel had a motion to make 
regarding lesser included offenses (T.200). Appellantfs 
counsel said Mr. Mora had declined his recommendation to 
have such an instruction given (T.200). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE 
PROSECUTOR TO QUESTION APPELLANT ABOUT HIS PRIOR CRIMINAL 
ACTS. 
During redirect examination the defense attorney 
asked appellant if a weapon had been used in the two 
prior felonies for which he had been convicted and he 
replied no (T.202). Prior to this, appellant had inferred 
that he had brought the gun to Mr. Ingle's house only 
for self-protection (T.170). Upon cross-examination, the 
prosecutor proceeded to ask about the gun used in the 
incident for which the appellant was then being tried. 
Then the prosecutor asked five questions as to whether 
or not appellant had offered to or threatened to do 
violence to other people, specifically one Rick Hausgo, 
prior to the alleged aggravated assault in question. 
A sixth question was asked in regards to violence appellant 
committed against Leslie Appling after the assault 
incident (T.204,205). Appellant denied having offered 
or;threatened violence to others but admitted violence 
to Leslie Appling in reply to the sixth question. 
It is generally true that in a criminal prosecution 
evidence of other crimes or offenses which tend to 
pjrove a character trait of the accused will be excluded. 
However, there are several well-recognized exceptions 
and limitations to this general rule. One important 
exception is when one is attacking the credibility of the 
accused's testimony. State v, Adams, 26 Utah 2d 377, 
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489 P.2d 1191 (1971), involved a defendant charged with 
assault with a deadly weapon. Through questioning by his 
own counsel Adams testified that he had been accused of 
prior criminal conduct. Such testimony was an attempt 
to show that defendant had been previously harrassed by 
police authorities. The prosecutor delved further into 
these unrelated fights and instances of violence in order 
to impeach defendant's previous testimony. The court 
first recognized the previously stated general rule by 
stating: 
"There is no doubt that defendant 
j was questioned about some matters 
I pertaining to his misconduct about 
which he ordinarily should not be 
subjected to inquiry." 
But the court then established a rationale for the 
aforementioned exception: 
"In [cross-examination defendant's] 
own counsel sought to show that 
defendant was a man of good nature and 
good character. . . The defendant 
himself having thus opened up the sub-
ject, it is quite proper for the State 
to question him on matters which might 
tend to challenge, contradict or 
explain his assertion." 
Id. at 1194. 
In accord Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 
10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959). 
The analogy to the present case is easily apparent. 
Through defendant's testimony that he had not used a 
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gun during his prior felonies and that he had brought 
the gun to Mr. Ingle's house only for self-protection 
he tried to assert the inference that he was not in-
clined to utilize a weapon, even in circumstances where 
it would be most expected. After the appellant had 
opened the door on this character trait the prosecution 
was correct in asking appellant about previous times 
that he allegedly professed a desire and willingness 
to do violence to or even kill others. 
Contrary to the charges in appellant's brief, 
this line of questioning by the prosecutor did have 
probative value and was not invoked for the sole pur-
pose of disgracing the defendant as a person of evil 
character. ; , 
j In fact, this evidence conforms to the standard 
set out in State v« Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 
P.2d 491 (1970), a case on which appellant relies. 
There the court ruled that evidence would be admissible 
when the:^ .;, 
"evidence concerning other crimes 
comes in as an intregal part of 
evidence which is competent and 
relevant to the charge upon which 
he is being tried. . .n Id at 492. 
The only contested issue of fact in this case was 
whether the appellant had used the gun in self-defense 
or for the purpose of threatening Mr. Ingle. By showing 
that Mr. Mora possessed a trait for violence, as 
evidenced by the instances brought out in cross-examina-
tion/ the prosecution correctly attempted to contradict 
or modify appellant's assertion of a non-violent character. 
The Supreme Court of Washington concurred with 
this type of cross-examination in State v. Washington, 
468 P.2d 684 (1970). The court affirmed a preliminary 
ruling by the trial court which acknowledged that if 
the defendant took the stand and testified as to his 
good conduct, the prosecutor would be permitted to 
question him on cross-examination on a specific act of 
bad conduct. The court said: 
"He [defendant] could have testified 
about events of the night of the crime 
and those leading up to it, without 
any fear of having his prior act of 
violence brought out on cross-examina-
tion. Only if he chose to assert that 
he was a non-violent person would the 
subject be opened up." :id. at 685. 
Furthermore, in light of the abundance of other 
evidence which supported a conviction of aggravated 
assault, it cannot be said that defendant suffered undue 
prejudice by the reception of this questioning. Even 
if such questioning was out of place, appellantfs 
denial of previous misconduct should adequately refute any 
inferences made by such questioning. Any error committed 
in this matter must be deemed harmless error since it did 
not have ". . .a substantial influence in bringing about 
the verdict cr finding" and this is required if a verdict 
is to be set aside for reason of erroneous admission of 
evidence. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, p. 3. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF HIS PRIOR GUILTY PLEAS 
TO FELONY CHARGES. ' 
Appellant's counsel made a motion to suppress 
evidence of prior convictions alleging that the guilty 
pleas that his client had entered in 1959 and 1963 must 
be deemed void and testimony concerning these convictions 
i 
should be disallowed because the record did not reflect 
the fact that Mora had voluntarily and knowingly waived 
his right of trial by jury, his right to confront 
accusers and his right against self incrimination 
(T. 190,193)* After the trial judge listened to appellant's 
testimony concerning these prior convictions and heard 
arguments by both counsel he determined that the con-
victions were valid and testimony of such was admissible 
for impeachment purposes (T.198,199). 
The well established rule that once a defendant 
has taken a witness stand he may be questioned about 
whether or not he has been convicted of any prior felonies 
has been incorporated in our statutes. Title 77-44-5, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states that: 
"if a defendant offers himself as 
a witness, he may be cross-examined 
by the counsel for the state the 
same as any other witness." 
and section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requires 
that: 
" . . . a witness must answer as to 
the fact of his previous conviction 
of a felony." 
See State v. Harless, 23 Utah 2d 128, 459, P.2d 210 
(1969) . 
Appellant does not question the fact that a 
defendant can be cross-examined about prior felony 
convictions for impeachment purposes. However, he does 
argue that a guilty plea is knowingly entered only when 
the three aforementioned constitutional guarantees are 
specifically waived. He bases this assertion on his 
narrow reading of certain dictum found in the case of 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 
L.Ed.2d 74 (1969). The holding of the court in the case 
was that the trial record must reflect that the accused 
voluntarily and intelligently entered a plea of guilty. 
He further contends that since the records of his 
guilty pleas do not reflect such waivers, those convictions 
are constitutionally void and therefore cannot be used 
for impeachment purposes. 
In Utah, there is a presumption that a plea of 
guilty is knowingly and intelligently made, and a 
defendant who attacks this presumption must overcome 
it by showing clearly that he was prejudiced by a 
denial of his constitutional rights. Mayne v. Turner, 
24 Utah 2d 195, 198, 468 P.2d 369, 371 (1970). For 
the following reasons, respondent submits that appellant 
has not overcome this presumption. 
The only evidence that appellant presented 
in support of his argument that these convictions were 
void was his own self-serving, unsupported testimony. 
He offered no record or transcripts of the prior pro-
ceedings. Such uncorroborated evidence clearly does 
not suffice to meet the hearing burden of overcoming 
the presumption of validity of the guilty pleas. 
In any event, the testimony given by appellant 
does not support his contention of invalid pleas. 
Appellant admitted at trial that he was properly re-
presented by counsel in both of the cases in question 
in which he plead guilty (T.183,184). This fact alone 
presents a presumption that he has been fully advised 
concerning his rights. Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 
2d 439, 442, 473, P.2d 901, 904 (1971), Arbuckle v. Turner, 
306 F.Supp. 825 (Utah 1969). Appellant further admitted 
at trial that at least in the first instance he was 
warned that he was waiving certain constitutional rights 
(T.183). Further, no evidence was produced to show that 
appellant was incompetant or not in control of his mental 
faculties when the pleas were made. Such testimony 
reaffirms the presumption that appellant did make 
counseled, knowing and voluntary decisions when he 
plead guilty. 
Furthermore, none of the United States Supreme 
Court cases after Boykin have required a judge to get 
a specific waiver of the rights suggested by appellant. 
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742. 90 S.Ct. 
1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, (1970), Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 
790 (1970), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970). ' 
The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 
held in United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 
1970), that the specific waiver of certain constitutional 
rights was an unnecessary element of a valid guilty plea. 
In that case, after discussion with counsel/ the defendant 
pled guilty to violating the Dyer Act. He later contended 
that the court failed to inform him that by pleading 
guilty, he was waiving certain constitutional rights. 
The court reasoned that it was self-evident that these 
rights were being waived, and that it would not add to 
defendant's understanding to "require the court to recite 
a ritualistic list of constitutional rights that are obviously 
being waived." Id at 403. 
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A final point should be noted in regards to 
Boykin, Careful reading of the cases defining the limits 
of Boykin shows that this 1969 case is clearly not 
retroactive and therefore is inapplicable to the earlier 
guilty pleas in question. Although the United States 
Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the retro-
active application of the Boykin rule, Brady v. United 
States, supra, at 747 footnote number 4, the issue has 
been raised in several circuit courts and it has always 
been held to be prospective only. Of particular im-
portance is the Tenth Circuit decision in Perry v. 
i 
Crouse, 42^ F.2d 1083 (10th Cir. 1970), wherein the 
court stated: 
"Considering the reasoning and the 
governing criteria on retroactivity, 
we conclude that Boykin v. Alabama 
should not be applied retroactively 
and agree with numerous cogent 
opinions to this effect." Id at 
1085. In accord Arbuckle v. Turner, 
440 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1971). 
Thus, appellant has failed to show that the 
guilty pleas were invalid under Boykin, and, a fortiori, 
has not met his burden of proving that the pleas were 
not knowingly and voluntarily made under the standards 
in effect at the time they were entered. 
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Appellant relies heavily on Loper v. Beto, 405 
U. S. 443, 30 L.Ed.2d 592, 92 S.Ct. 589 (1971), to 
emphasize the idea that admission of void convictions 
into evidence constitutes denial of due process. Loper 
involved a guilty plea that was given in violation of the 
accused's right to counsel at trial. As previously noted, 
appellant testified he was represented by counsel in 
both instances so Loper can be easily distinguished. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT INCLUDING 
AN INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SIMPLE 
ASSAULT. 
The court specifically asked appellant's counsel 
if he wanted to make a motion regarding lesser included 
offense (T.200). Mr. Kunkler replied "Your Honor, it has 
been my advice to my client to move the Court to put in 
an instruction concerning the lesser included offense of 
simple assault, and my client does not wish to do that. 
It would be my recommendation to put one in, but he does 
not want to." (T.200). Despite this statement the court 
considered the issue and concluded that the instruction 
of simple assault could not reasonably be supported by 
the evidence. He said he would not submit it to the jury 
even if Mora wasn't opposed to it (T.211,201). And later, 
after the instruction to the jury had been given the court 
asked if there were any exceptions (T.223). Appellant 
raised no exception to the fact that an instruction on 
the lesser included offense was not given (T.223,223). 
It has been consistently held by this court 
that a defendant should clearly indicate his desire 
to have a jury instruction given regarding a lesser 
included offense. See State v. Valdezf 19 Utah 2d 
426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967). As this court stated in 
State v. Standrod, 547 P.2d 215 (1976): 
"Ordinarily a litigant cannot 
claim error on an appeal for the failure 
of the trial court to give an in-
struction which was not requested 
and no exception taken to a failure 
i to give it." Id. at 218. 
In the instant case, the appellant did not 
request such instruction and specifically declined 
a recommendation by his attorney to do so. Additionally, 
appellant did not raise any exceptions to the absence of 
such an instruction. Such inaction can be seen as 
a calculated decision on the part of appellant to allow 
the jury only two verdict options; either guilty or 
not guilty of aggravated assault. In this respect 
the instant case is clearly distinguishable from the 
case relied on by appellant, State v. Close, 28 Utah 
144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972). In Close the court found 
it important that it was not a case "where it should be 
deemed that defendant made a deliberate choice of 
risking all or nothing by electing to go to the 
jury only on the major offense." I<3. at 288. Once a 
defendant has taken this risk and lost because the 
evidence supports his conviction, he should not be 
allowed to appeal simply because he calculated incorrectly. 
Another general rule followed in this state is 
that a trial court need not instruct on lesser included 
crimes in every case; it must do so only where there 
is some reasonable basis in the evidence to justify 
the giving of such instructions. See State v. McCarthy, 
25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971). 
In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (1976), 
this Court recently dealt with this issue. One of the 
three situations in which it said the problem of lesser 
included offenses would frequently arise is when, as 
in the present case; 
"Elements of the greater offense 
include all the elements of the 
lesser offense." 
The court concluded that in: 
". . . such a situation instructions 
on the lesser included offense may 
be given, because all elements of 
the lesser offense have been proved. 
However, such an instruction may 
properly be refused if the prosecu-
tion has met its burden of proof 
on the greater offense, and there 
is no evidence tending to reduce 
the greater offense." 
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A quick review of the evidence demonstrates 
the instruction was properly refused by the trial 
judge. According to appellant's own testimony he 
entered Mr. Ingle's home, uninvited, and while there 
pointed a cocked gun at Mr. Ingle's head at least 
twice (T.171,177). There is no factual question 
as to Mr. Mora's presence or his use of a deadly 
weapon. The only factual question before the jury 
was whether or not he brandished his weapon in self-
defense or for the purpose of threatening Mr. Ingle. 
The evidence in this case supports the instruction 
on aggravated assault. No instruction was needed 
on lesser offense of simple assault because the 
evidence clearly showed, and appellant admitted that 
a gun (deadly weapon) was involved. The jury could 
not have found defendant guilty of simple assault 
under these facts. 
The discretional refusal on the part of the 
trial judge to submit such an instruction should 
be upheld. The authority of the court to use its 
discretion in instructing on lesser offenses has been 
upheld numerous times. State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 
70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955), United States v. Enos, 453, 
F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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State v, Valdez, supra, a case of assault with 
a deadly weapon, also involved a defendant who was 
complaining on appeal that an instruction of simple 
assault should have been given even though he had 
not previously requested it. In affirming defendant's 
conviction the court stated: 
"We are firmly committed to the 
proposition that the rules of law 
and procedure must be adhered to, 
particularly in a criminal case. 
But once a fair trial has been 
afforded the defendant and a ver-
dict which is supported by the 
evidence rendered, the proceedings 
are presumed to be valid; and we 
I are not disposed to reverse for mere 
•'"I." technicalities or irregularities 
unless they put the defendant at 
some substantial disadvantage or 
had some material bearing on the 
fairness of the proceedings or its 
outcome." Id., at 55. 
I Certainly the supported verdict rendered in 
this case should not be reversed because an unsupported, 
unrequested instruction was not put before the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent contends 
1) that cross-examination on defendants past criminal 
conduct and prior felony convictions was not pre-
judicial error and 2) that instruction of simple assault 
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was properly not submitted to the jury. Therefore, 
respondent respectfully submits that appellant's 
request for reversal or a new trial be denied and that 
the verdict and judgment of the jury at trial be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
